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Thanks to the stringent disclosure regulations concerning execu-
tive compensation promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), I now know exactly how much more money Michael
Eisner, Chief Executive Officer of the Walt Disney Company, makes
than I do. The wide dissemination of this information has not proven
particularly beneficial either to Mr. Eisner or myself. Published re-
ports of Eisner's bloated pay package have prompted renewed contro-
versy concerning the burgeoning income of top executives in publicly
traded American corporations and made him a sort of poster boy for
greedy CEOs. Contemplation of my meager salary in relation to Mr.
Eisner's paycheck has also had an unfortunate result. It has produced
this Essay.
Executive compensation traditionally has been a matter of con-
cern to corporate law policy makers. It has long been recognized that
the intimate ties between top executives and the directors who set
their salaries create an inherent conflict of interest, a tendency toward
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overgenerosity exacerbated, in the case of publicly held companies, by
the fact that the money the directors are paying the CEOs is not their
own. However, given judicial reluctance to second guess corporate
decision making or judge any particular level of executive pay to be
unreasonable,1 the problem was also understood to be pretty much
insoluble through traditional legal means.
In the early 1990s, however, a new view of both the problem of
executive compensation and its appropriate solution took hold. The
problem was now seen not as management's ability to award them-
selves excessive compensation, but rather the failure of many compen-
sation packages to give management appropriate incentives to
maximize shareholder value. The obvious solution was for corporate
boards to change the form of compensation paid to top executives,
making it more performance-based through the use of such vehicles
as stock options, restricted stock, and performance-based bonus plans.
The new gospel of pay for performance was heartily embraced by
shareholder activists, regulators, and corporate management them-
selves. New SEC regulations, adopted in 1992, provided shareholders
with significantly increased disclosure about the compensation prac-
tices of their companies. New tax laws, passed in 1993, provided
strong incentives for such companies to link executive pay to corpo-
rate performance. The result has been a substantial increase in the
information about the pay of individual CEOs that is publicly avail-
able, a substantial increase in the use of stock options, performance-
based bonuses and other forms of pay for performance, and an enor-
mous increase in the amount of compensation actually paid to the
CEOs of public corporations.
Less concrete, but no less significant, has been the accompanying
change in public attitude toward CEO compensation. These days,
corporate CEOs are routinely lumped with other exemplars of the ce-
lebrity superrich such as bankable movie stars, franchise players in ma-
jor sports, and lawyers with their own talk shows. The business pages
1 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)
("I[I] n the absence of fraud, this Court's deference to directors' business judgment is
particularly broad in matters of executive compensation."). See generally Charles M.
Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1867, 1896-98 (1992). This reluctance to rule on the reasonableness of compensa-
tion is far less prevalent in cases involving closely held companies, where the execu-
tive/shareholder is essentially paying the compensation to himself and the one
challenging the reasonableness of the compensation (and therefore its deductibility)
is the Internal Revenue Service. See ROBERT C. CLARY, CORPORATE LAW 199-200
(1986); Detlev C. Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the
Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 257-61 (1983).
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are full of profiles of superstar CEOs, reported with the same contem-
porary mix of adulation, intrusiveness, and malice that can be found
in the sports and entertainment sections. Moreover, a combination of
legally required disclosure (with respect to CEOs), a vigorous and in-
quisitive press, and sheer braggadocio (by both the recipients of such
pay and their agents) has largely erased any reluctance the very rich
might once have had to show us their money.
Accordingly, those writing about executive compensation today
must deal with a problem that is perceived quite differently from the
traditional problem of executive compensation. In the good old days,
circa 1990 or so, the problem of executive compensation was that
greedy CEOs were receiving outrageous levels of compensation they
did not deserve. These days, the problem is that greedy CEOs are
receiving even more outrageous levels of compensation, which they
may very well deserve. The trend towards performance-based pay
means that some (although far from all) of the highest paid CEOs are
those that have obtained extremely good results for their sharehold-
ers, making their multi-million dollar bonuses seem like justifiable re-
wards for a job well done and making plausible (although hardly
proving) the proposition that such CEOs are being appropriately
compensated for their unique managerial skills.
But it would really be rather surprising if these highly skilled cor-
porate executives, whose talents, after all, consist primarily of their
ability to utilize corporate resources in the manner most likely to max-
imize the value of the firm, would not use those same talents to utilize
the corporate governance mechanisms in the manner most likely to
maximize the value of their own compensation packages. That is pre-
cisely what many have done. Far from erasing the fiduciary problems
inherent in executive compensation, the pay for performance trend
has opened new potential conflicts between shareholders, the com-
pensation-setting boards that shareholders increasingly view as their
surrogates, and the CEOs.
The theory of pay for performance is that shareholders benefit
when management compensation is significantly at risk, so that a high
level of compensation is dependent on a high level of corporate per-
formance. What most pay for performance fans tend to forget, how-
ever, is that it is not in management's interest to have a substantial
portion of their potential remuneration at risk. All other things being
equal, a CEO would much rather have the same levels of compensa-
tion at little or no risk. Accordingly, while CEOs and their compensa-
tion consultants often use the rhetoric of pay for performance to
justify higher amounts of compensation, they may also seek to reduce
1999]
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the risk attached by increasing the number of options granted, setting
easy performance goals, or repricing underwater options.
The enormous earnings of contemporary CEOs also have created
new issues about the social and economic effects of such pay levels. As
managers become super-rich based on the appreciation of their com-
pany's stock, the distinction blurs between investors and managers,
and between compensation and investment returns. Compared to
other shareholders, performance-based pay seems to make corporate
executives a privileged class that does not have to pay for its stock and
is largely protected from downside risk. Performance-based pay may
also create a disincentive toward entrepreneurship, as managers find
they can make as much money running large businesses as creating
new profitable ones-and with a lot less risk. A final concern is the
contribution of executive compensation increases to the growing ine-
quality of income, both within American society generally and even
among those with similar educational and professional qualifications.
This Essay examines these problems of executive compensation
in the era of performance-based pay. That is the era in which we find
ourselves, and it is not, on the whole, a bad place to be. Over the last
few years, the stock market indices have gone through the roof, corpo-
rate profits have soared, and the U.S. economy is the envy of the
world. While there is no empirical evidence directly linking perform-
ance-based pay of CEOs with improved corporate results, it would take
a more foolhardy liberal than me to categorically deny any possibility
that these salutary trends have any connection to the fact that most
corporate CEOs these days are paid mostly in stock options.
But even if paying CEOs enormous amounts for good perform-
ance is an improvement on the old system, in which CEOs received
somewhat less pay for indifferent performance, that does not mean
that performance-based pay has solved the problems of executive
compensation. Indeed, this Essay shows that performance-based pay
has exacerbated those problems in significant ways and, at the very
least, has increased the need for careful board oversight of executive
compensation decisions. Such oversight often seems to be lacking,
with disagreeable and potentially dangerous consequences for many
companies and for American society.
This Essay proposes one significant modification in the current
regulatory structure to address these problems: changing the present
one million dollar cap on the deductibility of nonperformance-based
pay into a cap on the deductibility of all executive pay that exceeds a
certain annual value (I suggest three million dollars), including the
present risk-discounted value of any performance-based pay. By
bringing the risk discounted value of performance-based pay within
[VOL. 75:1
BONUS QUESTIONS
the deductibility cap, such a rule would provide both an incentive and
a justification for board compensation committees to use something
other than the sky to limit the amount of executive pay increases. By
valuing such pay on a risk-discounted basis, moreover, the proposal
also seeks to curb managerial impulses to give themselves incentives
with little downside risk. It may even create a healthy competition
among CEOs as to who is willing to take the riskiest (and therefore
potentially most lucrative) pay package.
The broader point of this Essay, however, is that neither perform-
ance-based pay nor any other change in the form of executive com-
pensation can fully align the interests of management with
shareholders. Conflicts between agents and principals are built into
the structure of the public corporation. Compensation is one area
where they most directly conflict, and can only be ameliorated, never
solved. The elements most likely to restrain the perennial executive
push for more money are (1) full public disclosure concerning the
compensation of top executives; (2) institutional shareholder concern
and pressure for reform, at least in the most egregious cases of abuse;
(3) serious directorial attention and responsibility for justifying both
the form and amount of compensation they approve; and (4) a will-
ingness on the part of the executives themselves to accept greater risk
as a price for potentially greater compensation.
As the following Essay shows, the first two elements are already
largely, though not entirely, in place. The latter two, however, which
are equally critical in restraining compensation abuses, still need quite
a bit of work. This Essay examines the current state of executive com-
pensation regulation and practices. Part II provides a brief history.
Part III is a case study of the proxy statements of the Walt Disney Com-
pany and the recent controversies regarding its compensation prac-
tices. Part IV is a more general, abstract, and less funny analysis of the
problems of performance-based pay. Part V contains some sugges-
tions for reform that not everyone will find amusing.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF ExEcUTIVE COMPENSATION
Up until the beginning of this century, the problem of executive
compensation did not really exist. People who ran corporations made
money the old fashioned Marxist way--they owned the means of pro-
duction.2 Early in this century, however, the development of large
and relatively efficient capital markets, particularly in London and
2 SeeALFz.ED D. CHANDLER, JR-, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BusINEss 237-38 (1977); William W. Bratton,Jr., The New Economic Theory
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1989).
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New York, enabled budding entrepreneurs and established business-
men to raise capital through the public sale of stocks. 3 The result was
the familiar separation of ownership and control in the public
corporation.
4
This separation created a very great possibility that corporate of-
ficers could, in effect, steal corporate assets by obtaining compensa-
tion packages which exceeded the fair rate that they would have been
paid for their services by a single shareholder owner. The main regu-
latory effort to restrain such conduct has been to encourage certain
procedural safeguards like the delegation of all compensation deci-
sions to a committee composed solely of outside directors.5
As the corporate world changed over the last few decades, the
concept of appropriate executive compensation changed as well. The
sixties were the time of the great conglomerate mergers, when Harold
3 Stock offerings, of course, and stock fraud had been known at least since the
days of the South Sea Bubble. Nonetheless, until the early twentieth century, most
corporate entities were still dominated, as they are in many parts of the world today,
by individual or family ownership. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 1486.
4 See ADoLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN COR'ORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). According to Berle and Means, because of the diffusion of
ownership among shareholders in the modem publicly traded corporation, nobody
has the ability and inclination to exert effective control over the activities of corporate
managers. This creates the grave danger that corporate assets will be used for the
personal benefit of corporate managers. See id. at 66, 84. For Berle and Means, this
established both the necessity and normative justification for regulation of managerial
activity by the government and, in particular, by corporate law. The problem of exec-
utive compensation, when viewed from this fiduciary duty perspective, is that it poses
the problem of managerial self-dealing in the publicly held corporation in a particu-
larly intractable way.
5 Recommendations concerning the use of outside directors on such commit-
tees may be found in AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE § 3A.05(b) (1994). It has also been a major item on the agenda of American
shareholder activists and is strongly encouraged by recent changes in U.S. tax law. See
I.R.C. § 162(m) (4) (C) (i) (1994).
In practice, however, compensation committees generally rely on the expert ad-
vice of outside compensation consultants to inform them of the appropriate going
rates for corporate moguls. On the role of compensation consultants generally, see
GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss 215-16 (1991). These compensation consul-
tants are knowledgeable and skilled professionals. Their opinions, like those of in-
vestment bankers with regard to fairness, or those of counsel as to the legality of
proposed corporate action, are based on careful study, concern for their professional
integrity, and a profound understanding of who is paying their fees. Not surprisingly,
despite the existence of outside directors on compensation committees, instances of
egregious overcompensation can still easily be found in corporate America. See, e.g.,
id. A more up to the minute report on excessive compensation may be found on a
website maintained by the AFL-CIO. See Executive Pay Watch (visited Sept. 2, 1999)
<http://www.paywatch.org> (copy on file with author).
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Geneen at ITT and Charles Bluhdorn at Gulf & Western created vast
corporate empires based on friendly acquisitions of disparate compa-
nies to create an impressive but frequently unmanageable whole. Not
coincidentally, the captains of these corporate Titanics also led the
way in compensation packages. In Forbes' first survey of the highest
paid corporate executives in 1971, Harold Geneen of ITT finished
first, earning what now seems a measly $767,000 ($3,221,400 in cur-
rent dollars).6
After a major recession in the U.S. in the early 1970s, the era of
conglomerate mergers was replaced in the late 1970s and early 1980s
by the era of hostile takeovers. Executives might wake up and read in
the morning paper that some very rich but often vaguely disreputable
corporate raider was making a tender offer for control of their com-
pany (note the possessive). The price being offered to shareholders
through the tender offer was invariably at a premium well above the
stock's prevailing market price.
In addition to posing a major practical problem for corporate
managers, the growth and apparent success of many hostile takeovers
posed an interesting theoretical problem for corporate academics: If,
as is generally assumed, the capital markets are reasonably efficient,
7
how was it possible for corporate raiders to make money by purchas-
ing stock at well above market prices? The consensus answer, first ex-
pressed in the work of Professors Michael Jensen and William
Meckling, was that hostile takeovers allowed vigilant corporate raiders
to identify good companies with underperforming managers and re-
place them with stronger managers more responsive to shareholder
concerns.8 The increase in value created by such managerial changes
could cause an increase in corporate value sufficient not only to justify
the takeover premium, but to provide handsome profits for the raider
as well. An underlying premise of this argument, you will note, was
6 See Lawrence Minard, Executive Compensation-A Long Look Back, FORBES, May
19, 1997, at 12.
7 Market efficiency is a large and complex topic well beyond the scope of this
paper. See generally Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984). I am speaking here of the so-called "semi-strong"
version of the claim that U.S. capital markets are informationally efficient, that the
price of stocks on such markets fitly reflects all available public information about the
company such that it is not possible consistently to earn above average returns by
trading on the basis of such public information.
8 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). These ideas
were popularized among lawyers by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel in The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAgv. L. REV.
1161 (1981).
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that before hostile takeovers became popular, there were a lot of un-
derperforming corporate managers out there.9
In the 1980s an even more theoretically puzzling phenomenon
emerged: the MBO, or management buyout. Some officers of pub-
licly held corporations, sometimes in response to or in anticipation of
a hostile takeover bid, would make their own offer to shareholders.
They sought to take their companies private by purchasing all the
publicly traded stock, using borrowed funds which would later be-
come corporate debt secured against the assets of the company. The
MBO, if successful, would leave the management group as the sole
equity holders and the company with very large debt obligations. Like
the hostile raiders, these management groups also offered to buy out
existing shareholders at a substantial premium above market price. 10
The MBO phenomenon seemed to pose a major problem for the
theoretical understanding of control transactions. If the value created
by hostile takeovers was primarily due to the raider's ability to replace
underperforming managers, were managers who sponsored an MBO
paying a premium to, in effect, replace themselves? Perhaps surpris-
ingly, that was indeed what the theoreticians argued. Executives of
publicly traded companies might well be underperforming, said the
academics, not because they were lazy or lacked management skills,
but simply because, as unmonitored agents, they lacked incentives to
maximize shareholder value to the utmost. Quite the contrary, being
rational profit maximizers, managers would have powerful incentives
to utilize corporate cash flows in ways that would be most personally
beneficial, like well furnished offices and corporate jets. Once an
MBO occurs, however, that same management must generate suffi-
cient corporate cash flows to pay the whopping interest bills on the
debt it incurred to buy the company. Indeed, to make any money out
of an MBO, management must generate cash flow that exceeds both
operating costs and interest charges to create a profit. All the profit
that gets created, however, goes into the pockets of the new owner
managers." Many MBOs did succeed in creating such profits
9 Despite the growth of the takeover phenomenon, there still seems to be quite a
few underperforming corporate managers. For stories about some, see Joseph
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With Barbarians Inside the Gates,
45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 873-901 (1993).
10 For an excellent general discussion of the MBO phenomenon and the theoret-
ical issues it raised, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CoRPoRATE ACQuIsrrIONs 398-453 (2d ed. 1995).
11 For the most extreme version of this view, predicting the demise of the public
company as the dominant form of business enterprise, see Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse
of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
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(although many also failed).12 The lesson to corporate academics,
however, was that incentives were the crucial variable in managerial
performance.
The stage was now set for a fundamental reconceptualization of
the problem of executive compensation. Its popular expression came
in a 1990 article in the Harvard Business Review titled CEO Incentives-
It's Not How Much You Pay, But How.13 In that article, ProfessorsJensen
and Murphy argued that the problem of CEO compensation was not a
matter of excess compensation over some fair or reasonable rate, but
rather a misalignment of incentives. In a study of CEO pay over an
extended period, Jensen and Murphy showed that there had been lit-
tle correlation over the last thirty years between executive compensa-
tion and corporate performance. Rather, the primary determinant of
the size of the executive's compensation was the size of the corpora-
tion, not its profitability. They argued that appropriate regulation of
executive compensation would not involve reducing total pay or curb-
ing specific abuses, but encouraging performance-based forms of
compensation, like options and restricted stock, which more closely
aligned the executive's interests with those of shareholders.
Jensen and Murphy's article was extremely influential. It fit well
with both current theories of corporate governance and the prior ex-
perience of American business. It helped explain the empire building
of the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s, since in making their com-
panies bigger, even at the expense of profitability, those CEOs had
been able to justify ever greater compensation. It explained why hos-
tile takeovers, by replacing such managers and dismantling their cor-
porate empires, could increase shareholder returns and profitability.
It suggested that investors in all companies should do what managers
of MBOs had already done for themselves-align the interests of man-
agement and shareholders so as to maximize profitability.' 4
12 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 10, at 433-38.
13 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138.
14 It is not a coincidence that ProfessorJensen, a strong advocate of the efficiency
gains of MBOs, was also a major proponent of the move to performance-based
compensation.
As a theoretical matter, Jensen and Murphy brought compensation concerns into
the dominant conceptual model for contemporary corporate law theorizing, the
agency cost model. Whereas under legal concepts of fiduciary duty, the corporate
executive who feathers his own nest at the expense of the corporation is acting aber-
rantly and improperly, under the economic concept of agency costs, that same behav-
ior is simply the expected utility maximizing action of a poorly monitored agent. The
executive who owns only a small amount of stock in a publicly held company derives
only a minuscule portion of the benefit generated by an increase in the stock price.
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
As a public policy matter, viewing executive compensation as an
incentive alignment problem rather than as a breach of fiduciary duty
had major advantages. It avoided having to ask courts, compensation
committees, or anyone else to answer the difficult questions of how
much compensation was reasonable for a CEO, or whether the pro-
cess by which the compensation was set was fair. It substituted the far
easier question of whether the form of the compensation was struc-
tured so as to provide incentives for shareholder wealth maximization.
To the extent they did not, the solution was also easy-simply add
such incentives as additional compensation above the executive's ba-
sic salary.
Accordingly, by the early 1990s the old concern about compensa-
tion as a breach of fiduciary duty had been largely replaced by the
concern about compensation as a misalignment of incentives. This
reconceptualization was embraced by virtually all the participants in
the process. For institutional investors, it offered the prospect of in-
creased managerial incentives to boost shareholder returns. For pol-
icy makers, it offered a tractable definition of the problem, clear
policy objectives, and a viable regulatory program. For corporate ex-
ecutives and compensation consultants, it offered a powerful new set
of arguments to justify increases in executive compensation.
Not surprisingly, the two major changes in U.S. legal regulation
of executive compensation in the 1990s reflect this new emphasis on
performance-based compensation. The first change was the adoption
by the SEC of expanded disclosure rules regarding executive compen-
sation. 15 The disclosure required of public companies concerning the
compensation paid to their directors and most highly compensated
corporate officers was made much more detailed and specific. Com-
pensation committees were required to set forth the basis on which
their compensation decisions had been made, and comparative data
was required relating the company's stock performance to that of
other companies in its industry and to the market as a whole. The
second major change was tax legislation prohibiting corporations
from deducting any compensation paid to a corporate officer in ex-
Jensen and Murphy calculated that the average CEO of a public company received
$3.25 for every $1000 increase in shareholder value. SeeJensen & Murphy, Perform-
ance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). In contrast, he
derives 100% of the benefit from a corporate jet, an elaborately furnished office, or
Wednesdays at the golf course. On this view, increased monitoring of managerial
behavior by outside directors, increased threats of hostile takeovers, and increases in
the use of performance-based executive compensation were all beneficial to share-
holders in essentially the same way-as devices which reduced agency costs.
15 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992).
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cess of $1 million unless the additional compensation was perform-
ance-based. 16 When Bill Clinton ran for the Presidency in 1992, he
pledged to limit corporate deductibility of "excessive executive pay,"
which many interpreted as a cap on total pay. The legislation that
actually passed, however, instead creates strong incentives for incen-
tive-based pay. In the Section that follows, we will see these new rules
in action.
m. DIsNEY DoLLARs: A CASE STUDY OF COMPENSATION ISSUES IN
RECENT DIsNEY PROXY STATEMENTS
Proxy statements rarely make compelling literature. Characteri-
zations are weak, even though we get lots of information about the
leading players. Conflict is kept to a minimum, and plots are dull.
The recent proxy statements of the Walt Disney Company would seem
to suffer from these defects. Disney had a well-regarded management
that provided good, although not spectacular results in recent years
and a staggered board of directors running unopposed for reelection.
Nonetheless, the Disney proxies, and the shareholders meetings they
portended, have been subjects of major media attention. Like all the
best media stories, the Disney saga implicates serious policy concerns
while providing a vivid cast of characters and a direct connection to
show business.
The focus of the story is Michael D. Eisner, Chairman of the
Board and CEO of Walt Disney Company.17 Eisner, who had previ-
ously been President of Paramount Pictures, was recruited in 1984 to
be Disney's CEO.' 8 He is one of the most highly paid chief executives
of a publicly traded company.19 Between 1993 and 1996 he received
$228 million in compensation as the CEO of Disney.20 In 1997, he
negotiated a new employment contract.
Also making a significant appearance in the 1997 Disney Proxy
Statement was Michael Ovitz. Ovitz had been a leading Hollywood
agent and entertainment business entrepreneur.2 1 In 1995, when
Jerry Katzenberg (the President and number two man at Disney) re-
16 See I.R.C. § 162(m) (1994).
17 See WALT DISNEY Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 4 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 DISNEY PROXY STATEMENT].
18 See i& at 4-5.
19 In the Wall Street Journal's 1997 CEO compensation survey, Eisner's "total
direct potential compensation" of $601 million (which included $590 million in un-
realized option gains) far exceeded that of any other CEO. See The Boss's Pay, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R13.
20 See 1997 DISNEY PRoxy STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 28-29.
21 See id at 15.
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signed after a falling out with Eisner, Ovitz was recruited to take his
place. Ovitz negotiated a five-year employment contract for himself,
which included one million dollars in base salary, discretionary bo-
nuses, and five million dollars in stock options exercisable at market
price on the date of issuance. The agreement also provided that, if
Ovitz's employment with the company was terminated, most of these
payment provisions would accelerate, giving him a hefty severance bo-
nus. Ovitz also seems to have had a falling out with Mr. Eisner, and
his employment was terminated by mutual agreement as of December
31, 1996.22 He received termination benefits valued at up to $140 mil-
lion for slightly over one year of work.23 ByJanuary 6, 1997, derivative
suits had been filed in California and Delaware state courts challeng-
ing the payments to Ovitz as a breach of fiduciary duty.
24
There was also an intriguing cast of supporting characters, in-
cluding Roy Disney, nephew of founder Walt Disney, who is the larg-
est shareholder on the Disney board, owning 1.4% of the outstanding
shares,25 Sidney Poitier, the actor, who sits on Disney's board and its
compensation committee, 26 and Reveta F. Bowers, Disney board mem-
ber and principal of the private elementary school that Eisner's chil-
dren once attended. 27
The major theme of the 1997 Disney Proxy Statement is, without
a doubt, executive compensation. Of its thirty-five pages, twenty-one
are devoted directly to the subject. These include a four page report
of the Compensation Committee, another two pages summarizing the
employment agreements of Eisner and Ovitz, and six more pages of
summary charts and graphs relating to executive compensation.
Although these sections might have been a little shorter in proxy state-
ments for companies with less compensation to report, all of this in-
formation is basically required by the current rules of the SEC
governing executive compensation. 28 The heart of those rules are
summary charts and graphs delineating and analyzing the compensa-
tion of the five most highly compensated corporate officers. 29
22 See id.
23 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
24 See 1997 DIsNEY PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 9.
25 See id. at 2, 4.
26 See id. at 8.
27 See Anita M. Busch, Pond Crowd Pummels Eisner's Mighty Bucks, VARIETY, Mar. 3,
1997, at 9.
28 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992).
29 See id. "The Summary Compensation Table was praised by shareholder com-
menters as the linchpin of the Commission's revised executive compensation disclo-
sure scheme." Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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The Summary Compensation Table in the 1997 Disney Proxy suc-
ceeds (mostly) in giving us a pretty good idea of what is going on with
Disney's compensation practices. Clearly Eisner is first among equals.
Although his $750,000 base salary doesn't seem far beyond that of his
colleagues, the seven to eight million dollar annual bonus he received
during each of the three prior years clearly puts him in a different
category from the rest.a0 Even these amounts, however, were dwarfed
by the eight million stock options Eisner received in 1996 in connec-
tion with his new employment agreement. That is eight million op-
tions, not eight million dollars.
This is a good place for a short discussion of the critical question
of valuation disclosure. Obviously, when disclosing executive compen-
sation, a highly material fact to be revealed is the value of the compen-
sation received. For salaries and bonuses paid in cash, that is simple
enough. A dollar is worth a dollar. Restricted stock can also generally
The disclosures in the Disney Summary Compensation Table are far more de-
tailed than those required by the SEC prior to the 1992 revisions of the proxy rules.
Prior to that time, compensation could be aggregated for the top executives as a
group, but now it must be specified for each officer for each year. The amount of
compensation per individual must be reported separately for each of three columns
relating to annual compensation: (1) salary, (2) bonus, and (3) other annual; and
three others relating to long term compensation: (1) stock options, (2) restricted
stock, and (3) other, See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2). Actually, the Long Term
Compensation side of the Summary Compensation Table also has a separate column
for payouts made pursuant to a long term incentive plan (LTIP), but Disney, pursuant
to the Rules, left out that column-presumably because it had no such payouts in that
category. See § 229.402(b) (2) (iv).
30 These bonuses were not discretionary, but were bargained for as part of Eis-
ner's prior employment agreement. That agreement provided for a nondiscretionary
annual bonus equal to 2% of the amount by which the Company's net income for the
fiscal year exceeded the amount representing a return on stockholder's equity of
11%. See 1997 DIsN-EY PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 13. Although the note
relating to Eisner's long term compensation on the summary compensation table
states that Eisner's bonuses for all three of the years 1996, 1995 and 1994 were "calcu-
lated pursuant to the bonus formula in his 1989 employment agreement," the Com-
pensation Committee Report indicates that is not quite the case. Id. at 11, 16.
While the 1994 and 1995 bonuses did indeed follow the formula, in 1996 Disney
negotiated the acquisition of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), which re-
sulted in Disney acquiring an additional $12 million in debt and apparently throwing
off the old formula. Under the 1989 Employment Agreement, if the bonus formula is
significantly affected by a merger, the Compensation Committee can adjust it to yield
"an equitable and comparable result." Id. at 10. Accordingly, the 1996 bonus was
computed using pro forma accounting statements that reported Disney results for
1996 as if the ABC merger had not taken place. This may be particularly significant in
light of the subsequent controversy regarding a $2.5 billion reserve Disney took in
connection with the merger, a charge which allegedly enabled Disney to overstate its
earnings in subsequent years.
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be valued with reference to its market price on the date of issuance.3'
The more difficult valuation issue is posed by stock options, stock ap-
preciation rights (SARs), and their phantom counterparts.3 2
At the time a stock option is granted, assuming that its exercise
price is at or above fair market value on the date of issuance, it can be
argued that the option has no value whatsoever. After all, such op-
tions only confer on their owner a right which everyone else already
has with respect to a publicly traded security-the right to purchase it
at the market price. The appropriate answer to this line of argument
is, "If you think stock options have no value on their date of issuance,
please give me all of yours." The point is that stock options and their
equivalents confer on their owners the right to benefit from future
stock increases with no additional investment and no downside risk.
Accordingly, the right provided by the typical option-to purchase
company shares at a fixed price for an extended period (generally five
to ten years)-is a valuable right, even on the day it is granted. How
valuable, however, depends on the future performance of the com-
pany's stock, and that is a notoriously difficult thing to predict.
Because of these difficulties in valuation, the American account-
ing profession does not require companies to take any charge to earn-
ings when they issue options as executive compensation. In a recent
change, however, the accountants now require companies which do
not take such a charge to disclose the dilutive effect such option
grants would have on earnings per share if the options had been exer-
cised.33 By the same token, options are not taxed as income at the
time they are granted. Those that do not qualify for special tax treat-
31 Many companies offer their executives the right to buy stock at a discount from
market, often in connection with obligatory stock purchase requirements. See Adam
Bryant, Earning It: How Companies Make the Boss Buy Stock, but Soften the Pinch, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, § 3, at 1. In such cases, the value of the discount is the reduction
from the market price. In some cases, the stock is provided free as, in essence, addi-
tional compensation. See id. In some cases, the restrictions on transferability of such
stock or the possibility of its being forfeited if the executive is fired or leaves, might
warrant a diminution in valuation relative to the price of fully vested and freely trans-
ferable shares. Under § 83 of the Internal Revenue Code and applicable regulations,
stock received subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is not taxable income until it
can be freely transferred. See I.R.C. § 83 (1999).
32 For an extremely comprehensive, if now slightly dated account of the various
forms of stock-related long-term incentives programs, including stock options, both
qualified and non-qualified, SARs, and phantom stock plans, see generally Subcom-
mittee on Executive Compensation of the Comm. on Employee Benefits and Execu-
tive Compensation, Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor,
43 Bus. LAW. 187 (1987).
33 See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 123, § 49 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998); EARN-
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ment as "incentive stock options"3 4 are generally taxable when exer-
cised, based on the difference between the exercise price and fair
market value on the date of exercise. 35
While the valuation of such stock-based incentives may be uncer-
tain, in recent years, financial analysts, with the aid of sophisticated
financial models and some very powerful computers, have become
quite adept at making reasonable estimates concerning the present
value of options based on certain assumptions about the stock's vola-
tility, dividend yield, and prevailing risk-free interest rates. The most
popular and prominent of these valuation techniques is the Black-
Scholes option pricing model.
36
To get a sense of the value of the options granted to Eisner, one
must turn to the table, "Option Grants During Fiscal 1996."37 In that
table, Disney used the Black-Scholes model to compute the present
value for Eisner's options at over $195 million.
One final question before we leave these basic disclosures regard-
ing executive compensation: where, on these tables, is Michael Ovitz?
Ovitz, you recall, obtained cash and options worth $140 million from
Disney in 1996 as a result of getting fired and triggering the severance
provisions in his employment contract. That would seem to place him
at least second among Disney executives for 1996 compensation. Why
isn't he on any of the tables? It appears that under the SEC regula-
tions his termination benefits do not count as "compensation." Ac-
cordingly, the 1997 Proxy Statement blandly states that Ovitz was not
INGS PER SHARE, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 128, § 40(c)
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998).
34 See LR.C. § 422 (1994).
35 Options that qualify as incentive stock options are not taxable even when exer-
cised, but only upon sale or other recognition of income, where the increase in value
they represent is taxed as capital gains rather than income. By the same token, the
corporation gets no deduction when such incentive stock options are exercised.
36 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabili-
ties, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 637 (1973).
37 The SEC has required disclosure of certain pertinent information about stock
options, including disclosure of their likely value. The SEC provides two basic ways to
do this. One is to compute the potential realizable value of the option at the end of
the option period based on the assumption that the stock will rise at an annual rate of
5% and 10% over that period. This is not a conceptually elegant solution, both be-
cause the assumptions about stock value increases are totally arbitrary and because
realizable value is expressed in future rather than present dollars. It is, however, rela-
tively easy to compute. The second method, which Disney adopted, is to use one of
the present value option pricing models, with appropriate disclosures as to the as-
sumptions that went into the model.
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in the top five because he "did not receive a bonus for fiscal 1996."38
The failure of the SEC to require any specific disclosure concerning
severance or termination benefits in connection with its executive
compensation disclosure appears to be a deficiency in those rules.
Nonetheless, the 1997 Disney Proxy enables us to determine that
Eisner received a great deal of compensation in 1996, and it even
gives us a fair idea as to how much. Does it give us any information as
to whether he was worth it? The only objective data provided on that
subject are two graphs which appear on pages nineteen and twenty of
the Disney Proxy Statement. These are designed to enable sharehold-
ers to evaluate Disney's corporate performance in both absolute and
relative terms. The first graph shows how much $100 worth of Disney
stock purchased five years ago was worth at the end of fiscal 1996. It
then compares that with the performance of the shares of a group of
companies Disney has selected as its "peers" and with a broader-based
index, the Standard and Poor's 500 (S & P 500). Although this graph
may not seem to have much to do with executive compensation, it is
in fact mandated by the SEC as part of the 1992 revisions of its execu-
tive compensation disclosure rules.39 The concept, clearly a product
of the performance-based movement of the 1990s, was that if execu-
tives were being awarded above-average compensation, their compa-
nies should show above-average performance. 40 On this basis, the
five-year performance graph for Disney is a bit of a disappointment. It
shows Disney doing no better than its peer companies over the rele-
vant period and only slightly better than the broad based index.
Perhaps for that reason, Disney has included a second perform-
ance graph. This provides the same information, but provides it for a
twelve-year period beginning in 1984. Here Disney is clearly the
leader of the pack. Someone who invested in Disney in 1984 would
have earned about three times as much from this investment as some-
one who bought the peer companies on the S & P 500. Unlike the
38 See 1997 DIsNEY PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 14 n.1. On page 14 of the
Proxy Statement, however, we are told that he did receive a termination payment of
$10 million. The information about Ovitz appears to have been provided out of a
concern with the general SEC requirement that proxy statements disclose all material
information. See False or Misleading Statements, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979).
39 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992).
40 "In prescribing such a comparison, the Commission recognizes that many and
varied performance benchmarks other than shareholder return are used in the de-
sign of executive compensation packages. However, as reflected in many shareholder
letters of comment, shareholder return is a primary benchmark for shareholders and
investors in assessing corporate performance." Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 6962, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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five year graph that was mandated by SEC rules, this graph is not re-
quired by the SEC, although providing such additional information is
certainly not prohibited. It is also probably not a coincidence that the
performance period years begin in 1984, the year Eisner became
CEO. But Disney's great performance over the first seven years of Eis-
ner's stewardship and merely average performance during the next
five raises further questions about his current compensation. It could
be used to argue that Eisner should not seek to be paid for recent
years at the same levels he received in the eighties. The alternative
argument, of course, is that his drop in performance shows that he
needs more incentives.
This, in essence, is the argument of the Disney Compensation
Committee, whose report is also contained in the 1997 Disney Proxy
Statement.41 There is much language in the report praising incen-
tives generally and the performance-based nature of most of the com-
pensation the committee has awarded. There is no attempt to justify
the actual amounts being paid to Eisner.
This lack of justification was even more surprising in light of the
fact that Disney shareholders were actually being asked to vote on Eis-
ner's new compensation package. Such a vote was itself reflective of
recent changes in executive compensation law. Under § 162(m) of
the Internal Revenue Code, passed in the first year of the Clinton ad-
ministration, 42 compensation to an executive of more than one mil-
lion dollars per year is not deductible by the corporation unless it is
"performance-based." The statute goes on to identify compensation
as performance-based where: (i) it is based on performance goals set
by a compensation committee composed solely of outside directors;
41 SEC rules expressly require disclosure by the Compensation Committee of the
policies pursuant to which they set executive compensation for the prior year and the
bases for the specific compensation awards made. See 17 C.F.RL § 229.402. The re-
quirement that such information be "made over the name of each member of the
registrant's compensation committee" ensures that a report much like that of the
Disney Compensation Committee will be a part of every company's proxy statement.
§ 229.402(k) (3). The SEC rules tell committees to avoid "boilerplate language" in
describing the factors and criteria underlying their compensation decisions. Id. This
appears to be an impossibility, however, for committees containing one or more
lawyers.
42 During his 1992 Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton endorsed a plan to elimi-
nate corporate tax deductions for "excessive executive pay." Kevin G. Salwen, Clinton
Backs Executive Pay Set by Holders, WALL ST.J., Oct. 9, 1992, at C1. Prior to that time, a
number of bills had been introduced in Congress that sought to cap the deductibility
of executive compensation. One of them had been vetoed by President Bush. See
Yablon, supra note 1, at 1885 n.48. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code was
passed in August 1993 as part of the Omnibus Bill. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (1994).
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(ii) the material terms, including the performance goals, have been
disclosed to shareholders and "approved by a majority of the vote in a
separate shareholder vote before the payment of such remuneration";
and (iii) the committee certifies that the performance goals have in
fact been met.
43
Accordingly, in the 1997 Proxy, Disney shareholders were being
asked for the first time to approve the performance-based bonus plans
described in the Proxy Statement. In the absence of such approval,
the future bonuses paid by Disney would not be deductible. 44 The
description of the plan the shareholders were being asked to approve,
however, was surprisingly short on detail.45
43 See I.R.C. § 162(m) (4) (C). Payments pursuant to employment contracts en-
tered into before February 7, 1993 were not subject to these rules, so the impact of
the tax rules has only been felt gradually. See § 162 (m) (4) (D). As prior agreements
expire, however, companies are coming to realize that if they want to continue paying
bonuses of over one million dollars to corporate executives and deducting those costs
from corporate income, the new agreements must have clear performance goals and
be subject to prior shareholder approval.
44 Notice that, as with many shareholder voting problems, an affirmative vote of
the shareholders would not necessarily have indicated that a majority of shareholders
thought the levels of compensation being paid were appropriate. If shareholders be-
lieve the alternative to approving a compensation package is that the same compensa-
tion will be paid by the board but the company will receive no tax benefits from the
payments, the rational response to that coercively structured voting problem is to
approve all compensation packages.
45 Internal Revenue Code § 162(m) and the rules promulgated thereunder were
designed to sharply limit directorial discretion in setting performance-based compen-
sation. The agreements were expected to specify objective compensation criteria tied
to objective performance goals such that "a third party having knowledge of the rele-
vant performance results could calculate the amount to be paid to the employee."
Treas. Reg. §1.162-27(e) (2) (ii) (1995). Discretion of the board to adjust compensa-
tion amounts was severely limited. They could be reduced by the board or the com-
pensation committee, but they could not be increased. See i&i § 1.162-
27(e) (2) (iii) (A) (1995).
One might have expected, therefore, that the 1997 Cash Bonus Performance
Plan that the Disney shareholders were being asked to approve would specifically
identify the performance criteria the compensation committee would use in setting
bonuses and the precise amounts executives would receive upon attaining those per-
formance levels. It does not. Rather, it simply gives the newly created Executive Plan
Performance Committee the power to set such objective standards year by year based
on "Business Criteria," which may include any one or more of net income, return on
equity, return on assets, or earnings per share. Does the 1997 Disney Proxy at least
inform shareholders as to what performance the compensation committee will re-
quire of management in order to qualify for a bonus in the coming year? No again.
We are told that it is based upon net income, but "the Committee believes that the
specific target constitutes confidential business information the disclosure of which
could adversely affect the company," and, therefore, it does not have to be disclosed.
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One of the few poignant moments in the 1997 Disney Proxy
Statement appears in the shareholders proposals section, where a pro-
posal submitted by a number of Roman Catholic organizations con-
trasts the pay scales of Michael Eisner with both those of the average
U.S. worker and the reported wages of Haitian apparel workers who
make clothes for Disney and asks the Board to consider "whether a
cap should be placed on compensation packages for officers to pre-
vent our company from paying excessive compensation. '46 The Dis-
ney board recommends a vote "against." Its rationale, which
somewhat misses the point of the critique, is that Eisner's compensa-
tion is justified because nearly ninety-eight percent of it is perform-
ance-based. The issue of income inequality raised by the proposal is
left unaddressed.
The Disney shareholder meeting to which this proxy statement
was addressed was held on February 25, 1997 in Anaheim, California,
the home of Disneyland. Despite the fact that the meeting was held at
a freezing cold ice hockey rink and that the stockholders who at-
tended had all received free passes to Disneyland, the meeting lasted
over four hours. Eisner, who attended, received a substantial amount
of criticism from shareholders about his pay package as well as the
Ovitz termination. (He publicly admitted that the Ovitz agreement
had been a "mistake."47) Nonetheless, even before he went into the
See id § 1.162-27(e) (4) (iii). How about telling us how much the Disney executives
will actually receive next year if they meet these secret performance criteria? Fat
chance. Remember that under the rules, compensation committees have no discre-
tion to raise compensation from pre-established levels, but they are given negative
discretion to lower it even if the performance criteria have been met. Accordingly,
the 1997 Performance Plan sets maximum bonus amounts at extremely high levels.
See 1997 DISNEY PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at Annex 1, 2.2, 4.3. Not to
worry, however, the company informs us it is unlikely to actually pay bonuses of those
amounts but is merely preserving its discretion to "lower" the bonuses to any amount
it chooses. See id at 29. Accordingly, the shareholders were asked to approve a per-
formance-based compensation plan which will pay its executives some amount of bo-
nus based on some kind of performance criteria which have something to do with net
income. The proposal passed overwhelmingly.
46 1997 DISNEY PRoXY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 28-29. According to their
statement, Eisner in 1995 made 183 times more per hour than the average American
worker. Disney's response did not seek to refute this. See id.
47 Eisner is quoted as saying,
In our quest for the best, we make it clear we expect risk-taking, which may
sometimes lead to failure. I'd like to think this mistake thing doesn't apply
to me. And at home I make that clear to my children. But in the office, it
happens, as in the Michael Ovitz situation. Not good. A mistake. Won't
happen again. But my intentions and those of our board were appropriate
and, we thought, wise.
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meeting, Eisner knew he had more than enough votes to approve the
compensation agreements. The eight percent of the voting shares
that were voted against approval of Eisner's employment agreement,
however, and the additional three percent who abstained were consid-
ered an "unusually strong rebuke" of the company's compensation
practices. 48 Of course, the fact that approval of an executive compen-
sation agreement by slightly less than ninety percent of the voting
shares is considered a "rebuke" may also tell us something about the
effectiveness of shareholder voting as a curb on excessive
compensation.
The 1998 Disney Proxy Statement and Annual Meeting were a bit
of a letdown after the fireworks of the prior year.49 Eisner did not
receive any more options, although his $9.9 million performance-
based bonus on top of his $750,000 salary represented an increase in
cash compensation of twenty-three percent.50 Certain efforts appear
to have been taken to avoid some of the criticism Disney had received
the previous year, particularly from its institutional shareholders. For
one thing, the site of the meeting was changed from Anaheim to Kan-
sas City (no more free tickets to Disneyland), and space limitations
permitted shareholders to bring only one guest. More substantively,
the 1998 Proxy Statement sought authority to abolish the classified
nature of Disney's board and have each member stand for reelection
each year.
5 1
Christopher Parkes, Eisner's Princely Ways Cut No Ice with Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1997, at 17.
48 Id.
49 There was more media attention in December, 1997 when Eisner realized a
nice profit on some of the options he had been granted in 1989. By cashing in those
options and selling some more Disney stock, Eisner reduced his holdings in Walt
Disney by about two-thirds. At the time Eisner sold, Disney stock was near its all time
high, and the options did not expire until January 11, 1999, more than a year later.
Did Eisner see a correction coming? The justification for his timing was that Eisner
"felt he had a rare window of opportunity in which the company [was] experiencing
relative calm." James Bates, Company Town: Getting to the Bottom of Michael Eisner's
$565-Million Payday, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at D4. He apparently did not want to
sell shortly before the release of news that could trigger a major sell-off, which might
open him to charges of insider trading. See id. As it happened, Disney stock hit a
record high in May 1998 but took a sharp drop later in that year.
50 See 23% Rise in Pay for Disney Chief N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at D2.
51 See WALT DISNEY Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 21(1998)
[hereinafter 1998 DISNEY PROXY STATEMENT]. Such changes are generally favored by
institutional investors because classified boards are seen as an obstacle to potential
takeovers. Given Disney's size and the fact that it has other takeover defenses, like a
poison pill, one may wonder if the change to annual election of all directors may
actually give Eisner even greater influence over incumbent board members.
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In any event, institutional investors were clearly not placated.
The College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), an institutional inves-
tor which often takes public stands on corporate governance issues,
submitted a shareholder proposal which, in effect, attacked the Disney
board for not being sufficiently independent of management. It pro-
posed that a majority of the board and all members of the Audit,
Compensation, and Nominating Committees consist of directors with
no "significant personal or financial ties" to the company or its man-
agement. 52 While never mentioning Eisner or compensation issues
expressly, there is little doubt that the CREF proposal was a reaction
to Disney's problems of the previous year and reflected the view of
many observers that the Disney board has been a little lax in exercis-
ing managerial oversight.
53
The CREF proposal received over thirty-five percent of the vote,
an extremely strong showing for a proposal opposed by management,
and appeared to have received support from almost all of Disney's
institutional shareholders.5 4 To be sure, the proposal was not a direct
attack on Eisner or his compensation, but rather a vote in favor of
greater board independence.5 5 Nonetheless, the vote on the CREF
52 Id. at 23. Disney management opposed the proposal, not, of course, because
they disagreed with the principle of board independence, but with CREF's "exces-
sively restrictive" definition of independence. Id.
53 The CREF press release announcing its shareholder proposal specifically men-
tioned Eisner's stock options and the Ovitz matter. See CREF Shareholder Resolution
Urges Disney Board Restructure, PR NmvwsRE, Jan. 14, 1998 [hereinafter Shareholder
Resolution].
54 See Christopher Parkes, Disney Shake-Up Urged by Institutions: Campaign Seeks a
More Independent Board and Improved Corporate Governance, FIN. TnvMs, Feb. 25, 1998, at
17.
55 Board independence is for institutional investors what tax reduction is for
Republicans, an issue on which their philosophical predilections and pecuniary inter-
ests perfectly converge. The question is what kind of relationships with the company
or its top management impair a board's independence? Disney has many board
members who, while not currently employed by Disney, have personal or financial ties
to Eisner or the company. These include former Disney executives (E. Cardon
Walker, Gary L. Wilson), Father LeoJ. Donovan, the President of Gerogetown Univer-
sity, which one of Eisner's sons attended and to which he has donated over one mil-
lion dollars, Reveta Bowers, principal of a private school previously attended by
Eisner's children, George Mitchell, former Senator and special counsel to a law firm
that has done work for Disney and has also consulted personally for the company, and
Robert A.M. Stem, an architect, whose firm has completed multi-million dollar
projects for Disney and one for Eisner himself. The CREF proposal, which would
have defined as "independent directors" only as those with "no business or personal
ties to management or the Company that could interfere with or appear to interfere
with the director's loyalty to shareholders" would appear to exclude all these people.
See Shareholder Resolution, supra note 53.
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resolution does seem to reflect a growing unease in many parts of the
business community over the failure of boards or anyone else to im-
pose effective limits on executive compensation. As Graef Crystal, a
compensation consultant to the Disney board put it, in discussing
compensation trends generally, "[I] t can't go on like this forever.
56
IV. WEIGHING OPTIONS: THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY
The foibles and excesses of the rich are always amusing, but the
big policy question raised by these proxies is whether they actually
raise a big policy question. Are current corporate remuneration prac-
In 1998, the Delaware Chancery Court was also required to make a determina-
tion of the Disney board's independence in connection with the derivative suit re-
garding the Ovitz payments. In determining whether demand on the board could be
excused in that case, the Court had to determine whether plaintiffs had shown a rea-
sonable doubt as to the disinterest of at least half of the directors. See Steiner v. Mey-
erson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *26-27 (Del. Ch.July 18, 1995);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. Supr. 1984). It found such reasonable
doubt only with respect to Eisner and Stem. Of course, the Court was applying the
concept of "interest" under Delaware law, which is far narrower and more formalistic
than the CREF concept. When urged to rule that people like Bowers were in reality
under the influence of Eisner, the Court stated that "to discard 'formalistic notions of
interest and independence in favor of a realistic approach' expressly would be to
overrule the Delaware Supreme Court." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731
A.2d 342, 360 (Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 29).
56 The Problems with Executive Pay, J. Bus. STRATEGY, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 20. In-
deed, Disney may have dodged a bullet (or at least an uncomfortable shareholder
proposal) in its 1999 Proxy Statement. The proposal submitted by the Communica-
tion Workers of America (CWA) Pension Fund would have required executive stock
options to be much more "performance-based" than the ones Disney is currently us-
ing. Rather than options whose strike price is the stock's market price on the day of
issuance (which were most, but not all of the options Eisner has received), the CWA
proposal would limit "performance-based options" to "either 1) stock options with the
exercise price indexed to an appropriate S&P 500 peer group index (such as the
index used in the Company's annual proxy statement) or 2) premium-priced stock
options, which set the exercise price of the option above the current market value of
the stock." Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act LEXIS 959 (Oct.
29, 1998).
Disney sought to exclude this proposal from its 1999 Proxy Statement on the
ground that it dealt with "ordinary business operations" and was excludable pursuant
to Rule 14a-8 (i) (7). Disney also argued that CWA had failed to provide the verifica-
tion of its stock ownership in a timely fashion as required by Rules 14a-8(b) and (f).
The SEC accepted this latter argument and granted a no-action letter without reach-
ing the first question. See id Nonetheless, with a little more attention and careful




tices, and the regulation that encourages them, a serious cause for
concern? Or do critics of Eisner and his ilk merely have a bad case of
options envy?
The Disney story illustrates well both the progress and problems
in the field of executive compensation. Current SEC disclosure rules
succeed fairly well in providing clear and detailed information to
shareholders concerning the compensation practices of publicly
traded firms, though a few problematic areas such as termination and
severance pay remain. (Remember Michael Ovitz's curious absence
from the Disney proxy?) 57 There is also an increasing concern from
shareholder activists about compensation that is either excessive in
amount or lacking in serious performance standards, and perhaps
some sharing of this concern by institutional investors. Yet these de-
velopments have not succeeded either in restraining executive pay in-
creases or requiring higher performance standards, because most
CEOs do not want them and most boards are not inclined to impose
them. The result is that although there has been a substantial in-
crease in "performance-based" compensation,58 this has fueled an
57 Similar issues were involved in the recent controversy involving the partial gov-
ernment takeover and restructuring of Long Island Lighting Company (Lilco), when
it was discovered that Lilco's former CEO would receive a $42 million severance pack-
age as part of the deal. This was considered particularly egregious since he was not
even being terminated, but would remain CEO of the successor corporation. In re-
sponse to claims by various state government officials that they had no knowledge of
the severance pay, a spokesman for Lilco stated, "Executives' compensation disclo-
sures are made in appropriate Securities and Exchange Commission filings." Bruce
Lambert, Citics Say a Lilco Takeover Would Greatly Enrich Its Chief N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1998, at B8.
58 Reports on executive pay universally confirm that an ever larger percentage of
firms are using performance-based pay to compensate their top executives and that
an increasing percentage of the pay of most top executives is performance-based. A
recent study by Towers Perrin, a major compensation consultant, found that in 1996
approximately two thirds of executive pay was performance-based, as opposed to fifty-
four percent in 1989. See Irwin M. Stelzer, Are CEOs Overpaid 2, PUB. INTREST, Jan.
1997, at 26; see also Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1998, at 2
("The real money now comes from the exercise of options, long-term incentive plans
and perks.").
In many companies, some form of stock ownership by executives is mandatory.
In the last five years, over 20% of the 1000 largest U.S. companies have adopted
guidelines requiring their officers to own stock equal in value to several times their
annual salaries. Significantly, such rules rarely require the stock to be purchased at
market price. It is frequently given to the executives or sold at a deep discount as
additional executive compensation. See Bryant, supra note 31 § 3, at 1.
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even greater increase in total CEO compensation, which has now
reached unprecedented levels .
5 9
Part of this, of course, is simply the combined effect of the trend
to performance-based pay and a raging bull market. When your com-
pany's stock price is rising by ten percent or more a year, who would
not seek stock options as a major chunk of their compensation? Not
coincidentally, both the increase in executive pay and the rise in the
stock market have been led by the "blue chips. '60 A major downturn
in the market will probably dampen the rate of increase for a time,
but wages are notoriously "sticky downward" (i.e. nobody likes to take
a cut in pay), and CEO compensation levels are likely therefore to stay
about where they are, even if stock prices drop, and they will be
poised for another run up when good times return.
But is the ever increasing wealth of successful CEOs a matter for
serious public concern? America has always been a land of opportu-
nity. Why should we care if a group with managerial talent is getting a
59 While there is universal agreement that the compensation of CEOs has risen
enormously in the 1990s, getting hard data as to exactly how much it has risen turns
out to be surprisingly difficult. Surprising because the raw data for such statistics, the
compensation paid to the top executives of publicly traded companies is now easily
available from their proxy statements. Compiling that data, however, is another mat-
ter. Business Week and Forbes both publish annual surveys of executive pay, but their
methodologies (and their numbers) differ considerably. Business Week looks at the
compensation of the two highest paid executives at approximately 365 companies,
and it generally provides the average increase in (1) salary and bonus only and (2)
total compensation (which includes the exercise of stock options). Forbes looks at the
same data, but for CEOs only, and uses a broader survey of approximately 800 compa-
nies. Forbes computes the rise in median pay for this group rather than average pay,
which tends to lessen the impact of Eisner and other super-rich CEOs on the num-
bers. Finally, both Forbes and Business Week compute total pay by looking at payments
received each year through the exercise of options, not at the grants of unexercised
options during the year. Since executives tend to wait to exercise their options until
the market is high, this gives the total pay numbers for both Forbes and Business Week a
certain roller coaster quality.
Nonetheless, there seems to be little dispute that there have been some big raises
lately in the executive suites. In its survey for 1998, Business Week found a 36% in-
crease in total pay (80% of it in options and other long term compensation). See
Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1999, at 72. In 1997, Business Week
found that in total average pay had risen 35% over the previous year, (although aver-
age salary and bonus alone had dropped slightly). See Reingold, supra note 58, at 2.
Business Week reported that the annual increase in total CEO compensation for 1996
was 54%; for salary and bonus alone, 39%. SeeJennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus.
WIt., Apr. 21, 1997, at 58.
60 The DowJones Industrials Index is comprised of the stock prices of some of
America's largest companies. Its rise to 10,000 in 1999 represents a 263% increase for
the decade. SeeJennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1999, at 72.
BONUS QUESTIONS
lot richer a lot faster than it used to? If we have indeed achieved a
fairly transparent system of executive remuneration which creates in-
centives for managers to maximize shareholder value and provides
those managers with enormous benefits while doing so, maybe we
should just pat ourselves on the back and invest in some more index
funds. This is not a stupid position; I suspect that it is the one held by
most people in the business community as well as a majority of corpo-
rate law academics.
But this benign perspective on current compensation practices
rests ultimately on the view that nobody is really getting hurt by exces-
sive compensation. Sure, there may be a few CEOs who are getting
more than they would get in a perfect (or perfectly competitive)
world, but as long as the shareholders are happy (and when the Dow
is at 10,000, they certainly seem happy), who else has a right to com-
plain? This view itself, however, is a significant part of the problem.
The idea that any level of compensation is justifiable so long as it is
performance-based is the very view expressed by the Disney Compen-
sation Committee. It is a view which encourages boards to abdicate
their critical role in setting reasonable limits on managerial compen-
sation, increasing the perennial danger of wealth transfers from share-
holder to managers, and exacerbating other undesirable societal
trends.
Who is hurt by excessive executive pay? Certainly those share-
holders are hurt whose earnings are diminished or whose shares are
diluted by options grants to CEOs. Investors as a group are hurt if
more deals are being structured to meet performance goals or com-
pensation concerns of incumbent management rather than to maxi-
mize shareholder returns, or if fewer talented managers are interested
in starting or investing in new businesses because equally great and far
less risky returns are available to them from managing established
ones. And society as a whole is likely to be hurt if an increasing
number of its brightest and most talented people feel obligated to
pursue managerial careers but become frustrated by their failure to
make it to the lucrative top of an increasingly unequal "winner take all
society."
A. Shareholder Concerns
As the recent Disney vote indicates, even shareholders of fairly
successful companies are beginning to realize that giving CEOs
whatever they want so long as it is "performance-based" is not in the
best interests of shareholders. In the first place, what CEOs mostly
want is lots of compensation for very little risk. Shareholders, even if
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willing to pay lots of compensation, want it to be at risk to provide the
appropriate incentives. Second, all of that compensation has to come
from somewhere, and that somewhere is the shareholder's earnings
per share, either through diminished profits or dilution of outstand-
ing shares. Finally, managerial overreaching and directorial acquies-
cence may be tolerable in good financial times, but may create habits
that are difficult to break when economic times turn bad. The possi-
bility of wealth transfers from shareholders to managers has existed
for a long time. Performance-based pay, however, provides new and
audacious ways to accomplish such transfers.
All of these concerns come together in two of the most troubling
aspects of current compensation practices-megagrants of stock op-
tions and options repricing. Excessive performance-based pay can re-
sult from either excessive amounts of compensation or insufficient
performance requirements. These days, the most spectacular forms
of excess are "mega-grants" of stock options, like the eight million op-
tions paid to Eisner. Such payments, which do not reduce corporate
income (at least in the year they are made) have become, if not ex-
actly the norm, a not uncommon feature of the compensation land-
scape. As such megagrants become an accepted feature of
compensation practice, it becomes easier for compensation consul-
tants and the committees they advise to justify their use for other
CEOs in other companies. 61 Indeed, the trend toward showering
CEOs with options has become so pronounced that even many of the
shareholder advocates who were prime movers of the pay for perform-
ance bandwagon are expressing some second thoughts.
Their concern, not surprisingly, is with diminution in risk and
loss of incentives. If the CEO is handed an options package with a
present value of one hundred million dollars, an average or even be-
low average rise in market price of the underlying stock will be
enough to make him quite rich.62 About the only thing he really has
61 Another way to pile on the options is through "reloads." These are options
which, when exercised, automatically confer on their owner the right to receive addi-
tional options (although a smaller number than the amount being exercised). The
ostensible purpose is to encourage CEOs to exercise their options early, but the effect
is also to increase the total number of options granted and to remove board discre-
tion from the grant of the reloads. SeeJennifer Reingold & Leah Nathans Spiro, Nice
Option If You Can Get It, Bus. Wy-, May 4, 1998, at 111.
62 Lawrence Cunningham, describing Warren Buffett's views on these matters,
notes that
simply by retaining and reinvesting earnings, managers can report annual
earnings increases without so much as lifting a finger to improve real returns
on capital. Stock options thus often rob shareholders of wealth and allocate
the booty to executives. ...
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to worry about is a major sell off or crash, and even that can be solved
by a little option repricing. In short, while large grants of stock op-
tions are generally considered performance-based pay, they often in-
volve large payments with very little risk attached.
63
Granting large blocks of options not only reduces the CEOs risk,
but potentially dilutes the wealth of existing shareholders. Institu-
tional investors talk about the "overhang" effect created when options
relating to ten percent or more of a company's shares are held by
executives and waiting to be exercised. The point is not that such
megagrants are always a bad idea and should be prohibited, but that
they impose heavy and often hidden costs on existing shareholders
and should therefore not be granted by boards lightly or as a matter
of course.
A similar point can be made about another recent focus of share-
holder concern-options repricing. Critical to the idea of perform-
ance-based pay is that managers must have a credible fear that poor
corporate performance will decrease their compensation. Because
most American companies have been doing very well in recent years,
the impact of performance-based pay on unsuccessful companies is
spotty and unclear. Some managers have indeed accepted the downs
as wells as the ups of incentives, taking sharply reduced, even zero pay
when stock prices have dipped,64 but there are also a disturbing
number of cases in which failed performance-based plans have simply
been replaced with new, richer plans with easier targets. This has out-
raged some shareholder advocates who rightly point out that other
Stock options can encourage owner-like thinking among managers, Buf-
fett agrees, but the alignment will not be perfect. Shareholders are exposed
to the downside risks of sub-optimal capital deployment in a way that an
option holder is not.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett on the Role of the Board, 19 CORP. BOARD 6, 9
(1998). Cunningham tells us that Buffett concludes that "stock options should simply
not be part of an executive's compensation." Id.
63 Die-hard supporters of such grants will rightly point out that just because such
options provide enormous wealth with little risk does not mean that they fail to create
incentives. The options will still make the CEOs substantially richer as the company's
stock continues to rise, and perhaps nobody ever feels they are rich enough. Accord-
ingly, the potential decrease in incentives attributed to megagrants, while plausible,
ultimately rests on unknowable psychological factors.
64 Last year, when Disney's stock price and earnings were flat, Eisner's bonus was
reduced to five million dollars from $9.9 million the previous year. Given the ex-
traordinary levels that CEO pay has reached, it is hard to know what to make of this.
On the one hand, it was a substantial pay cut of 49%. On the other hand, it was still a
five million dollar bonus for flat earnings.
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investors do not get such second chances, and have even suggested a
ban on option repricing.
An exclusive focus on repricing, however, reflects a misunder-
standing of the basic problem, which is not about the use of certain
forms of pay, but the acquiescence of boards in pay packages that pro-
vide CEOs with little incentive or downside risk. The critical issue is
not the repricing itself, but whether the CEO knows, or has a reason-
able expectation, that a poor stock performance will result in a repric-
ing. Obviously, such expectations will destroy any incentive effect the
options plan might have had. But viewed as a compensation decision,
repricing a CEO's options may be a reasonable compensation strategy
if offered by a board to create new incentives for a CEO, where the
prior downturn is not seen as a CEO's fault and where the repricing
creates no expectation of further repricings. 65 The comparison with
the losses of other shareholders is essentially a red herring because,
although in the form of an investment opportunity, the board's deci-
sion is really about compensation and creating appropriate incentives
for future performance. As we will see, however, the creation of such
confusion between investors and managers is itself one of the
problems of performance-based pay.
A final and serious danger for shareholders is the increased in-
centive performance-based pay gives CEOs to manipulate the timing
of reports about corporate performance and perhaps to manipulate
the substance of those reports as well. This is not traditional insider
trading, but the harder to detect and police problem of CEOs delay-
ing or accelerating disclosure of information because of the effect it
may have on a personal compensation issue.66 Announcements of
bad corporate news will tend to come after, rather than before, the
65 One possible example would be AirTrans Holdings, Inc., formerly Valujet,
which took on a new CEO in late 1996, after the May 1996 crash of a Valujet plane.
When the stock continued to fall in the three months after the new CEO took office,
making the options he had been given at the time he was hired virtually worthless, he
was given new options based on the board's judgment that the continued stock de-
cline was not due to the CEO's performance. See Barry Flynn, Paid for Performance-
Good or Bad: CFB's Annual Survey of Executive Pay Has Again Found That Corporations' Top
Officials Reap Huge Rewards Whether or Not They Manage Well, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May
25, 1998, at 20.
66 For example, the Chicago Herald reported, "Investors are reportedly angered
that earnings estimates were lowered and 6400 additional job cuts were announced
just weeks after [former Sunbeam Corp. Chief Executive] Dunlap signed a three-year,
$70 million deal to remain in the top spot of the consumer products company." Mike
Comerford, Executive Severance Packages Create a Stir, CHICAGO DAILY HmALD, June 17,
1998, Business, at 1.
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date a CEO has exercised his options.67 CEOs have all the traditional
informational advantages of intimate knowledge of the company, as
well as power over the timing of such public announcements.
- Even more troubling may be the effect on corporate perform-
ance. Most compensation is tied to earnings either directly, (through
performance goals), 68 or indirectly, through stock price. There is a
growing concern, both at the SEC and among investors, about the
increasing use of accounting gimmicks to inflate corporate earnings.69
Some have even suggested that the increased use of stock options and
other performance-based CEO compensation may be a factor in the
increased use of such tricks.
70
B. Concerns About Economic Incentives
The issues raised thus far about performance-based pay are really
just new variations of traditional shareholder concerns. The most
troubling issues raised by the growth of performance-based compensa-
tion, however, are based on an entirely different and more morally
complicated set of issues. These larger societal issues are posed most
67 Conversely, bad news might be announced preliminarily if a CEO is about to
receive an options grant at market, thereby giving the CEO a lower price against
which to appreciate. While the former example might constitute an insider trading
violation (although one with significant problems of proof), the latter example proba-
bly does not.
68 For example, Eisner's bonuses in fiscal 1999 and thereafter are tied to in-
creases in earnings per share. See 1997 DISNEY PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 23.
69 See Jack O'Dwyer, Levitt Hits Accounting "Gimmicks," 31 JACK O'Dwaa's Navs-
LETrER 7 (1998); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Buffett Deplores Trend of Manipulated Earnings,
N.Y. TrMEs, Mar. 15, 1999, at C2. Disney was accused of such practices in an article by
accounting professor Abraham Briloff in Barrons in May 1998. See AbrahamJ. Briloff,
Disney's Real Magic: Is the Entertainment Giant's Accounting Pure Mickey Mouse, BARRONS,
Mar. 23, 1998, at 17. Briloff alleged that the company, by taking an undisclosed re-
serve of $2.5 billion in connection with its acquisition of Cap Cities, was able to charge
expenses in subsequent years against that reserve, rather than against current income.
It was alleged that this enabled Disney to report a 25% increase in earnings for fiscal
1997, whereas without it the increase would have been only 15%. See O'Dwyer, supra;
Oppel, supra. The article was apparently a factor in the subsequent decline of Disney
stock.
70 See David W. Tice, You Still Can't Trust Corporate Earnings Numbers: Outlandish
Accounting Methods Still Build Up to Awful Letdowns, ON WALL STrUr, Dec. 1, 1998 ("I
believe that the proliferation of stock options has given issuers extra incentive to keep
Wall Street happy. Stock options represent at least 45% of executive compensation
(according to a 1996 study), and there's nothing like meeting Wall Street expecta-
tions to drive a stock (and its options) higher and higher."). It should be noted that
during the same period that Disney was, according to Professor Briloff, overstating
earnings, Eisner chose to exercise his options and reduce his stake in Disney. See
supra note 50.
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strongly by successful CEOs, those like Eisner who have overseen ma-
jor increases in corporate profitability and intoxicating rises in stock
prices. 71 With performance-based pay, some of these executives have
become not merely rich, not merely very rich, but stupendously, in-
comprehensibly, bone-chillingly rich. Are there social, economic, or
moral reasons to seek to prevent CEOs of publicly traded firms from
using their positions to amass sizeable personal fortunes?
The increasing amounts of money being paid to a small number
of corporate managers poses troubling questions about economic in-
centives and social equity. Although a capitalist critique of CEO pay
may sound like an oxymoron, there is something vaguely anti-capital-
ist in performance-based compensation that gives managers all the
benefits of successful stock investments while removing most of the
downside risk. Traditionally, there have been significant differences
in the risk/reward structures of owners and managers. Entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists investing in start up or small companies took
large risks in the hope of obtaining even larger rewards. Corporate
raiders and LBO (leveraged buyout) specialists were also willing to put
their (admittedly often borrowed) money where their mouths were.
Managers of established corporations, who took much smaller risks,
could not expect to receive the same levels of income as a successful
entrepreneur, investor, or corporate raider.
The levels of compensation that are now becoming available to
successful CEOs threaten to erode this distinction between managers
and owners. One effect may be on the kind of deals CEOs pursue.
We are already seeing various kinds of "going public" transactions in
which one of the benefits cited is the increased ability of the company
to pay its executives in stock options. In the hostile takeovers and
LBOs of the 1980s, entrepreneurs spent large amounts to acquire con-
trol. In the 1990s, the deals are friendlier and seem less about control
and more about size. Some entrepreneurs, most famously Ted Tur-
ner, have been willing to give up control in exchange for a managerial
71 Eisner should not be viewed as a particularly egregious example of CEO greed,
but as simply the leader of a trend. Another celebrated recent example of excessive
pay for successful performance has been Charles Wang, CEO and co-founder of Com-
puter Associates, Inc. (CA). Wang was the recipient of a performance-based bonus
plan under whose terms he was to receive the lion's share of a stock grant of over 20
million shares if the company's stock rose above $53.33 and stayed there for 60 days.
The bonus plan was set when CA's stock was around $22, so the achievement of the
performance goal, which provided Wang with stock valued at $675 million when it was
reached in May 1998, was obviously a successful result. As of September 1998, CA
stock was back to selling for around $30. See Richard J. Dalton, Jr. & PradnyaJoshi,




position in a larger publicly held company. Many of the mega-deals of
the 1990s not only provide enormous payouts to the option-holding
managers of the merged companies, but more ominously, hold out
the prospect of even larger pay packages to the managers of the
larger, newly created entity. Perhaps these new corporate giants really
need to pay such amounts to attract the top level managerial talent to
exploit the synergistic potential of these new mega-firms, but the
trend seems disturbingly reminiscent of the conglomerate mergers of
the 1960s.
Equally troubling are the incentive effects of a corporate world in
which CEOs of existing companies make as much as top entrepre-
neurs and investors. The problem is not that Bill Gates deserves to
make more than Michael Eisner in any deep moral sense, or even that
he has a harder job. But people who try to emulate Bill Gates and
create moderately successful new businesses are an important source
ofjobs and economic growth. It is not at all clear that the same is true
for people who try to emulate Michael Eisner and wind up stuck in
middle management.
C. Equality Concerns
This brings us finally to the relationship between CEO pay and
income inequality. From a traditional liberal perspective, the in-
creased concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few people
poses substantial dangers: reduced incentives for promising students
to pursue socially beneficial but low paying careers in education, engi-
neering, etc., when the lure of business school beckons, and the
growth of a politics of resentment among the less well off that can be
exploited by left or right wing demagogues. 72
In their book, The Winner-Take-All Society,73 Professors Robert
Frank and Philip Cook describe both the changes they see as leading
to the increase in income inequality in America and the policy argu-
ments for seeking to limit and reverse that trend. The danger is not
so much class warfare (although in a country that has seen urban ri-
ots, rural militia movements, and repeated Pat Buchanan Presidential
bids, such dangers cannot be completely ignored) but the threat to
fairness, community, and decency created by vast disparities in wealth.
Almost nobody, rich or poor, wants to live in a society dominated by a
72 Peter Drucker, the dean of management gurus, opposes current trends in ex-
ecutive compensation largely on this basis, and according to Drucker, J.P. Morgan
would have opposed them as well. See Bill Tieleman, Executive Pay Backlash: Corporate
Gurus Predict Action as Inequality Grows, NAT'L POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at C4.
73 See Robert H. FRANK & PHnUPJ. COOK, THE WINNR-TAxE-ALL SociETY (1995).
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small group of extremely wealthy people, a somewhat larger group of
the fairly well off, and a large majority of individuals who are barely
making ends meet. That said, however, it must be conceded that CEO
pay has little to do with the income gap between rich and poor, which
is much more a function of disparities in education, decline in the
labor movement, and changes in the job market.
CEO pay is much more directly involved in the growing disparity
of incomes within the top twenty percent. This is the concern to
which Frank and Cook's book is primarily addressed, and they make a
persuasive argument that in a society in which the vast majority of
benefits go to the lucky few, there will be a great deal of inefficient
utilization of resources as people fail to accurately assess their chances
of hitting the big time. Such people will waste time, energy, and re-
sources struggling to become, say, unhappy and not very successful
executives, corporate lawyers, or basketball players, when, if pay scales
for otherjobs had been a little closer to those of top CEOs, lawyers or
ball players, they might have found more satisfying careers as teachers,
carpenters, or engineers. Thus, Frank and Cook argue, the growth of
income inequality violates norms, not only of fairness, but of effi-
ciency as well.
But what about the argument that these folks are worth it-that
they create enormous value for the people who pay them? Unlike the
older critics of executives and others who earn similar amounts, Frank
and Cook do not deny that they may well be "worth it" in the narrow
sense that existing markets make it rational for owners or investors in
certain enterprises to pay enormous amounts for the services of cer-
tain individuals. But markets themselves are artificial things, con-
stantly changing due to developments in technology, regulation, and
taste. Clearly, if motion pictures and television had not been in-
vented, Mel Gibson and Michael Jordan, even with precisely the same
skills, would not command the compensation they get in today's mar-
kets. The public corporation itself, as we noted previously, is the
product of the legal development of capital markets in early twentieth
century. In short, the fact that highly paid executives may be "worth
it' given the market in which they sell their services does not make
them any more normatively entitled to such compensation than a lot-
tery winner.
But even if excessive executive compensation poses all these
problems, and even if a little more board oversight and restraint in
approving CEO pay packages would be a good thing generally, this
does not mean that additional regulation is advisable. The increased
regulation may create more problems than it solves, or the problem
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may be self-correcting. We consider these issues and a modest propo-
sal for change in the next Section.
V. TBE THREE MILLION DoLLAR SOLUTION-DEDUCrrIBLInY CAPS
AND PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY
Ideally, under the American system of corporate governance, the
primary source of restraint and deliberation with respect to executive
compensation decisions should be the board of directors, particularly
its compensation committee. In practice, directors rarely have rea-
sons to negotiate hard on CEO salaries, but they often do have power-
ful incentives to give the CEO what he wants. In addition to the
intangible ties of friendship and admiration that frequently unite di-
rectors with the CEO who may have been responsible for their ap-
pointment, there is the sound managerial judgment that a happy CEO
is likely to be a maximally productive CEO. Accordingly, if that CEO
thinks he needs eight million options to perform his best, who wants
to try to bargain him down to four million, thereby running the risk
he may feel resentful or unloved and spend more time either at the
golf course or looking for another job. Moreover, there is undoubt-
edly a compensation consultant standing by, assuring the board that
the compensation package requested by the CEO is easily justifiable in
light of general rises in compensation levels, the fact that most of it is
performance-based, etc. In short, once the board has decided that
their current CEO is the right person for thejob (and that tends to be
the attitude of most incumbent boards), they have little incentive to
exercise restraint in negotiating his compensation package.
Is there anyone else who might encourage limits on executive
compensation? Institutional investors are obvious candidates, but
they operate under many of the same constraints as directors. It may
well be worthwhile for relational investors with sizable stakes in a com-
pany to seek to remove CEOs who are underperforming or opposed
to value-enhancing corporate restructurings. But if a relational inves-
tor basically approves of current management and is looking to the
CEO to increase corporate earnings and share value, such an investor
has little incentive to pick a fight over a few million dollars of CEO
compensation.
At one time I had hoped that corporate gadflies and investor ac-
tivists, by publicizing and bringing lawsuits against the worst abuses,
might impose a general restraining influence on compensation deci-
sions. But this has not come to pass.
In the absence of any other likely sources of limits on the ever
upward trend of compensation decisions, I submit it is time to rethink
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the idea of a deductibility cap. I know the idea of governmental limits
on the amounts someone can earn seem anathema to many on ideo-
logical grounds. But a deductibility cap is far from a prohibition or
any sort of wage or price control. It simply says that for every dollar
above the cap which the board decides to pay to its CEO as compensa-
tion, it must also pay thirty-five cents7 4 to the federal government. In-
deed, it is precisely the extreme reluctance of American business
people to pay extra amounts of corporate tax, in contrast to their gen-
eral willingness to pay extra amounts of executive compensation,
which makes the deductibility cap a potentially effective restraint on
excessive compensation. It provides a marker, a signpost, at which
boards and compensation committees are likely to stop and consider
the compensation decision more closely, with their reluctance to in-
cur the double corporate tax bite acting as a counterweight to their
general inclination to give the CEO whatever he wants.
It should be remembered, of course, that there already is a de-
ductibility cap in the current tax law, but by applying only to nonper-
formance-based pay, the message it sends is that there are no limits
with respect to performance-based pay. As we have seen, it is this
same attitude which underlies the philosophy of many compensation
committees and has the pernicious effect of causing them to abdicate
any efforts at restraint. A deductibility cap on total pay (performance-
based as well as not) would have a salutary effect of reminding boards
that all forms of compensation must meet criteria of reasonableness.
It is not difficult to design a deductibility cap that would apply to
all forms of compensation while retaining strong incentives toward
performance-based pay. One could keep the current one million dol-
lar cap on nonperformance-based compensation, but give corpora-
tions a right to deduct an additional amount, I would propose an
additional two million dollars, in performance-based pay. The fact
that companies can pay up to three million dollars to their executives
in performance-based form while only one million dollars in straight
salary should still provide a powerful incentive for most companies
and executives to prefer performance-based pay.
Another incentive to performance-based pay would be to com-
pute the deductibility cap on the present value of the options or other
performance-based pay at the time of its issuance. Thus, stock op-
tions, for example, could be valued in accordance with the Black-
74 The current marginal corporate tax rate is 35%. Of course, the company does
not actually have to pay tax on the compensation, the CEO does that in any event.
Rather, it loses the right to deduct the one dollar as an expense and therefore loses
the 35 cent tax benefit, which amounts to the same thing.
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Scholes option pricing model. The law would provide a cap on the
deductibility of payments attributable to options with a present value
above the deductibility cap.7 5 Options that met the deductibility crite-
rion, however, would still provide performance-based incentives, since
they would still increase in value one dollar for every dollar rise in the
company's stock.
Valuing such pay on a risk discounted basis, moreover, might
channel the natural competition among CEOs into more shareholder-
beneficial forms. It is likely that the push for ever higher levels of
executive compensation is at least as much the result of competition
among CEOs for recognition and reward as it is a reflection of CEO
demands for a living wage. Valuing compensation on a risk dis-
counted present-value basis would mean that a CEO could get more
compensation, within the deductibility cap, if he were willing to ac-
cept more risk. For example, a CEO who was willing to accept options
with a strike price ten percent above market could receive more such
options than a CEO who demanded a strike price equal to market on
the day of issuance and still qualify under the deductibility cap. A
CEO who took options set at twenty-five percent over market could
receive even more. There are indications that many CEOs would be
inclined to take such riskier compensation, which represents a vote of
confidence in both their own managerial skills and their company's
prospects. If the Forbes and Business Week surveys focused not merely
on which CEOs made the most, but on which CEOs realized the most
total value from securities with an initial risk discounted present value
of three million dollars, they would provide a closer alignment be-
tween CEO success and shareholder benefit.
What are the likely objections to a revised deductibility cap? The
most predictable is a general ideological objection to governmental
interference in the market for executive compensation. If superstar
CEOs can command multi-million dollar bonuses in today's market,
more power to them, and the government has no business poking its
nose into the compensation-setting process. Pointing out that the
government already regulates the compensation setting in various
ways would have little weight as a counterargument, since the inevita-
75 Since options are generally not deductible or charged to earnings by the cor-
porations when issued, but rather when they are exercised, the determination of ap-
propriate tax treatment and the effect of the deductibility cap would take place in
different years. For example, if stock options issued in year one had a present value in
that year of $2.9 million, any payment made by the company in relation to the exer-,
cise of those options would be deductible even in later years, even if that latter
amount was, say, $10 million in year five.
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ble rejoinder would be that the present limits on executive compensa-
tion should also be abolished.
The more cogent objection to this line of argument is to question
its premise that, absent governmental regulation, the CEO compensa-
tion-setting process would be an efficient one, characterized by arms
length bargaining and a rational assessment by the board of the value
the CEO creates for the firm. As we have seen, compensation deci-
sions rarely resemble arms length bargains but involve inherent ten-
sions and conflicts of interest, and the results often raise questions as
to the board's impartiality and objectivity. But all big CEO pay pack-
ages are not inherently breaches of fiduciary duty either. Rather, an
honest assessment of the compensation-setting process in American
public companies would recognize, as the Delaware Supreme Court
put it in another context, "the omnipresent specter that a board [and
management] may be acting primarily in its own interests" 76 when de-
termining CEO pay. Such concerns, as the Delaware Supreme Court
also recognized, call not for a flat prohibition on the questionable
conduct, but for higher levels of consideration and review, such as
those a deductibility cap might promote.
The above considerations also respond to a more sophisticated
version of the prior objection, which is "Why single out CEOs?" Lots
of people are earning enormous compensation these days,77 yet only
CEO pay is subject to these special tax rules. The answer, of course, is
that only CEOs are likely to have the kind of intimate relationships
with the people who are setting their salaries, which inherently raise
concerns. In addition to the fact that CEO compensation is more
likely to involve excessive wealth transfers than corporate payments to
movie stars or investment bankers, a restraint on CEO compensation
may have salutary effects on other spiraling pay scales. If, as seems
likely, most people judge appropriate compensation levels in compari-
son with their own pay, a limit on their own compensation may make
CEOs a little more reluctant to approve big corporate payments to
others when the benefits of such payments to the company are not
clearly apparent.
76 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. Ch. 1985).
77 As Russell Baker recently put it,
The big-really big!-paydays are pretty much confined to two lines of work.
One is drawing a crowd. The bigger the crowd you draw, the bigger the pay.
The other lucrative line of work consists of moving vast clumps of money
from one pocket to the other. The legal rules in this line of work allow
people who move the money to skim percentages of the money being
moved.
Russell Baker, Observer: Up There in High Dungeon, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A21.
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BONUS QUESTIONS
Aside from these philosophical objections, there are various tech-
nical concerns that might be raised. Present valuations of uncertain
future returns is not an exact science. There are certainly dangers
that companies will "massage" the computations to bring their present
value calculations within the deductibility cap. Exotic forms of com-
pensation might be concocted for which relatively standard valuation
methods like the Black-Scholes model do not exist, giving companies
greater leeway to avoid the rules. All these points boil down to the
concern that some companies will cheat and other will hire high
priced experts to help them beat the system. In short, a deductibility
cap will be treated like any other restrictive tax rule. But the nice
thing about the deductibility cap is that it does not have to be perfect
to work well. Even if companies can find ways to pay their CEO com-
pensation with a value of somewhat more than three million dollars,
the fact that boards focus on and feel constrained by the three million
dollar limit would mean that the deductibility cap was performing its
function, which is simply to promote restraint on executive pay levels.
A greater concern is that the deductibility cap might actually raise
compensation levels by turning the maximum level of pay into a mini-
mum. There is some indication of such a tendency in connection
with the present one million dollar salary cap. Given current trends in
executive pay, however, it is hard to imagine that incentives to boost
pay will be increased by a three million dollar deductibility cap.
Three million dollars is already at or close to median total pay accord-
ing to many of the surveys. Compensation committees that feel their
companies are too small or too poor to pay that level of compensation
are unlikely to change their views as a result of a deductibility limit.
Even if they do, the limit would remain as a restraint on future
increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
A story is told about a college dean, an unusually kind and dedi-
cated scholar. One day, right in the middle of a faculty meeting, dis-
cussion of curricular issues was interrupted by celestial music and an
angel descending from heaven. "Dean," said the angel, "because of
your great benevolence and good works, I have been authorized to
grant you a gift. You may choose any one of the following: (1)
profound wisdom and knowledge of the universe; (2) wealth beyond
your wildest dreams; or (3) an extremely long life in perfect health
and fitness."
The Dean, who was dedicated to the life of the mind, did not take
long to answer. "I would like the knowledge, please," he replied.
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There was immediately a loud thunderclap, a puff of white smoke,
and then the Dean sat alone again in front of the faculty, a bemused
expression on his face. After a long silence, one of the faculty mem-
bers spoke up, "Dean, can you give us any insights based on your new
wisdom?" The Dean looked at them all for a minute and said, "I
should have taken the money."
Convincing CEOs not to take the money, and compliant boards
not to authorize its payment, is a difficult task. This task has been
made more difficult by the pay for performance movement, which
may sometimes bring the incentives of shareholders and CEOs into
closer alignment. But it also gives CEOs new justifications for larger
pay packages and directors fewer reasons to expect criticism for ap-
proving them. A cap on deductibility of excessive levels of executive
pay will not reverse this trend, but it may help to reintroduce into
compensation committee meetings and compensation decisions that
most underappreciated of virtues-moderation.
